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Abstract This paper proposes a computational game-theoretic model for the
international negotiations that should take place at the end of the period cov-
ered by the Kyoto protocol. These negotiations could lead to a self-enforcing
agreement on a burden sharing scheme given the necessary global emissions
limit that will be imposed when the real extent of climate change is known. The
model assumes a non-cooperative behavior of the parties except for the fact that
they will be collectively committed to reach a target on total cumulative emis-
sions by the year 2050. The concept of normalized equilibrium, introduced by
J.B. Rosen for concave games with coupled constraints, is used to characterize
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a family of dynamic equilibrium solutions in anm-player gamewhere the agents
are (groups of) countries and the payoffs are the welfare gains obtained from
a Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model. The model deals with the
uncertainty about climate sensitivity by computing an S-adapted equilibrium.
These equilibria are computed using an oracle-based method permitting an
implicit definition of the payoffs to the different players, obtained through
simulations performed with the global CGE model GEMINI-E3.
Keywords Climate change negotiations · Dynamic game model · Coupled
constraints · Stochastic modal jumps
1 Introduction
In this paper we use a computational management science approach to study
the strategic interactions of groups of countries when they shall negotiate the
sharing of burden to stabilize the long term concentration of greenhouse gases
(GHG). More precisely we develop a dynamic game model where the strate-
gies of each player (state or group of countries) refer to the timing of emis-
sions abatement and the payoffs are obtained in terms of welfare gains (or
losses), after implementation of an international emissions trading scheme,
compared with the business as usual (BAU) situation. These welfare gains are
obtained through simulations performed with a Computable General Equi-
librium (CGE) model. In this game a coupled constraint is imposed on all
players together in order to limit the total emissions over the whole planning
horizon. Games with coupled constraints have been first studied by Rosen
(1965) who showed that a whole family (manifold) of equilibrium outcomes
should be expected, indexed over a set of weights attributed to the players. The
appropriateness of the normalized equilibrium concept to deal with environ-
mental games seems to have been first recognized by Haurie (1995) and further
explored by Haurie and Zaccour (1995) and Haurie and Krawczyk (1997). In
this paper we explore the manifold of normalized equilibria both in a determin-
istic and in a stochastic framework about the scientific knowledge concerning
the climate sensitivity.1
This game theoretic approach sheds a new light on the possible terms of
the post Kyoto negotiations on climate change and the role that developing
countries could have to play in long term climate change mitigation policy. The
use of a game theoretic model instead of a global optimization one is justi-
fied by the following considerations: Provision of global public goods such as
climate change mitigation must be voluntary since states or groups of coun-
tries can be induced but not forced to contribute to the global reduction of
GHG emissions. In other words, international climate agreements must be
self-enforcing. This condition has often been related to the characterization of
1 The climate sensitivity CS parameter determines the surface atmospheric temperature change
resulting from a doubling of GHG concentration compared with the preindustrial level.
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policies that constitute a Nash equilibrium in a non-cooperative game for the
nations involved in the climate negotiation process. For example several authors
have used game theoretic paradigms to study incentives based on issues link-
ages consisting in exchanging concessions across different policy dimensions
(Carraro and Siniscalco 1996; Buchner et al. 2005). We explore the possibil-
ity to build self-enforcing agreements on the timing of emission caps for the
different parties corresponding to different world regions. For that purpose we
propose a dynamic game model which assumes a non-cooperative behavior of
the parties except for the fact that they will be collectively committed to reach
a target on total cumulative emissions by the year 2050.
The dynamic game structure corresponds to the nature of the global climate
challenge. As stated in the United Nations Framework Convention on Cli-
mate Change (UNFCCC), the ultimate goal is the “stabilization of greenhouse
gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous
anthropogenic human induced interference with the climate”. Based on the
assessment of climate impacts of global mean temperature rise, scientists con-
firm previous reports that, globally aggregated, the danger level begins once
global mean temperature rises 2◦C above preindustrial levels. In the deter-
ministic version of the model one assumes that the sensitivity of the climate
system to radiative forcing is known and implies that the CO2 concentration
should be stabilized at no more than 550 parts per million by volume (ppmv).
In the stochastic version of the model one assumes that there is still a global
uncertainty on the real value of the CS parameter. Depending on this value
different global limits on cumulative emissions will be imposed on all countries
together in order that the concentration levels remain within a tolerable window
in terms of environmental and ecological damage.2 Then the different parties
in an agreement behave as non-cooperative players, even though they realize
that a global cumulative emissions constraint is binding all countries together
in the long run.
Achieving this target will be a major challenge that will require a participa-
tion of large developing countries since they constitute an important potential
source of GHG emissions in the future. As said in a recent EU communique,
An effective future multilateral climate change regime will require all major
emitters to contribute by limiting or reducing their greenhouse gas emis-
sions. Without the participation of other developed countries and key emit-
ters among developing countries, substantial cuts in EU emissions alone
will fail to achieve the 2◦C target.
States and regions have thus to agree on the long term GHG concentration
target to reach collectively. Given this common target each (group of) nation’s
respective contribution to the international effort will be guided by its own
interest, if the agreement has to be self-enforcing. The battle against global
warming is thus a mixture of cooperative (attainment of a common goal) and
non-cooperative (economic selfishness) behavior. In that context, international
2 See Toth (2005) for a discussion of the tolerable window concept.
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GHG emissions trading might be used as a mean to reduce the economic costs
of the emission constraint, and to create incentives for participation through
financial transfers. Once the global goal is defined the degrees of freedom left
to the players reside in the timing of their abatement commitments. The nor-
malized equilibrium concept finds a solution associated with a weighting of the
different players. For example if one increases the weight given to DCs, the
share of burden for these nations in satisfying the global constraint is reduced
and the sequence of abatement is obtained as a best reply to the decisions made
by other (groups of) countries. Therefore, in addition to the global aim dictated
by the climate dynamics, the negotiation will also have to decide the weighting
given to the different groups of nations that will be parties in the agreement. In
this paper we compute the manifold of normalized equilibria when we consider
only 3 groups of nations, USA, rest of OECD (also called IND), DCs (also
called SUD), and when one varies the weighting given to these players in the
equilibrium definition. The model used is a two-level dynamic game where gov-
ernments try to get the best agreement for their respective economy knowing
that, once quotas are fixed, the economic agents will be confronted to market
competition for GHG emission quotas.
From an Operations Research perspective, the paper implements an oracle
based technique to solve variational inequalities. The oracle here is the CGE
that computes the welfare gains to the different players and their sensitivities to
emission cap decisions. The technique converts the variational inequalities into
a kind of convex feasibility problem, which can be solved, with known com-
plexity, via the homogeneous analytic center cutting plane method (ACCPM)
(Nesterov and Vial 1999). In the present paper, we use the variant described in
Babonneau et al. (2006) of the original non-homogenous version of ACCPM
(Goffin et al. 1992). Its behavior is quite similar to the homogenous one, but its
complexity for variational inequalities is not established. In our experiments,
the non-homogenous version performs very well.
It is important to notice that the game we solve is about allocations rather
than a game on the overall target.We assume that a 2o target would be accepted
by all countries of the world (although one may expect that a common agreed
global target will probably be the crux of the matter during the second commit-
ment period negotiations). We model a coupled constraint on total emissions
and let the players play noncooperatively on the timing and allocation of their
respective shares of this overall burden. We do not claim that we define levels
of emission reduction that leave every player better off when playing the game
than staying out of the game.
The paper is organized as follows: the structure of the coupled game model
is presented in Sect. 2; in Sect. 3, we briefly present the multi-sector and multi-
country CGE model of the world economy that is used for numerical simula-
tions; the Analytic Center Cutting Plane Method (ACCPM) implemented to
solve the weak variational inequality problem is described in Sect. 4; in Sect. 5
we give the numerical results obtained for a case study where countries have
to decide on their own abatement level under a global target on cumulative
GHG emissions by 2050 which is consistent with a commitment to limit global
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temperature rise to 2◦C above pre-industrial levels; in Sect. 6, we conclude and
envision future extensions of this model.
2 The model
In this section we present a stochastic game model reduced to its simplest
formulation with only two periods, the first one corresponding to the commit-
ments to be negotiated in the period 2010–2025, and the second one corre-
sponding to the recourse to be played by the actors in the 2025–2050 period
when the real severity of climate change will be known.
2.1 Players, moves and payoffs
The game is played over 2 periods t = 0, 1. M is a set of m groups of countries
hereafter called players which must decide on the caps they impose on their
respective global emissions of GHGs in each period. Let  be the set of possi-
ble realizations of the climate sensitivity (CS) parameter values. We represent
the uncertainty on this value as an event tree as shown in Fig. 1.
Let π(ω) be the probability of realization ω ∈ . We denote e¯j(t,ω) the cap
decided by player j for period t and CS ω ∈ . In period 0 the CS is unknown,
therefore the following equalities must be satisfied:
e¯j(0,ω) = e¯j(0,ω′) ∀j ∈ M,∀ω,ω′ ∈ . (1)
In period 1 the CS is known. and each player adapts its decision e¯j(1,ω) to the
observed realization ω. Depending on the realization ω ∈ , a global limit E¯(ω)
will be imposed on the cumulative emissions of both periods t = 0, 1. Therefore
the following coupled constraints are binding all players together:
∑
j∈M
1∑
t=0
e¯j(t,ω) ≤ E¯(ω) ∀ω ∈ . (2)
Fig. 1 Climate sensitivity
uncertainty
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Let e¯(t,ω) = {e¯j(t,ω)
}
j∈M denote the vector of emissions caps for all players in
period t, andCS valueω. Given these cap values a general economic equilibrium
is computed for the m-country which determines a welfare gain for each player,
hereafter called its payoff at t,ω and denoted Wj(e¯(t,ω)). Given a choice of
emission programs e¯ = {e¯(t,ω)| : t = 0, 1;ω ∈ } the expected payoff to player j
is given by
Jj(e¯) =
1∑
t=0
∑
ω∈
π(ω) Wj(e¯(t,ω)) j ∈ M. (3)
2.2 Normalized equilibrium solutions
We assume that the players behave in a noncooperative way but are bound to
satisfy the global cumulative emissions constraints (2) that are contingent to
the realization ω of the CS. The solution concept that we propose to use is an
adaptation of the so-called S-adapted equilibrium solution introduced inHaurie
et al. (1990) and further studied in Haurie and Viguier (2003) and Haurie and
Moresino (2002). It is also related to the concept of normalized equilibrium
introduced by Rosen (1965) to deal with games where the players are bound by
a coupled constraint. In the S-adapted information structure one assumes that
the players adapt their decisions to the revelation of the uncertain parameter
value. However one does not assume that the players can adapt their decisions
to the history of the game, i.e. to the decisions taken by the other players in
previous periods.
Let us call E the set of emissions e¯ that satisfy the constraints(1) and (2).
Denote also [e¯∗−j, e¯j] the emission program obtained from e¯∗ by replacing only
the emission programm e¯∗j of player j by e¯j.
Definition 1 The emission program e¯∗ is an equilibrium under the coupled
constraints (2) if the following holds for each player j ∈ M:
e¯∗ ∈ E (4)
Jj(e¯∗) ≥ Jj([e¯∗−j, e¯j]) ∀e¯j s.t. [e¯∗−j, e¯j] ∈ E . (5)
Therefore, in this equilibrium, each player replies optimally to the emis-
sion program chosen by the other players, under the constraint that the global
cumulative emission limits must be respected.
It is possible to characterize a class of such equilibria through a fixed point
condition for a best replymapping defined as follows. Let r = (rj)j∈M with rj > 0
and
∑
j∈M rj = 1 be a given weighting of the different players. Then introduce
the combined response function
θ(e¯∗, e¯; r) =
∑
j∈M
rjJj([e¯∗−j, e¯j]). (6)
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It is easy to verify that, if e¯∗ satisfies the fixed point condition
θ(e¯∗, e¯∗; r) = max
e¯∈E
θ(e¯∗, e¯; r), (7)
then it is an equilibrium under the coupled constraint.
Definition 2 The emission program e¯∗ is a normalized equilibrium if it satisfies
(7) for a weighting r and a combined response function defined as in (6).
TheRHS of (7) defines an optimization problem under constraint. Assuming
the required regularity we can introduce a Kuhn–Tucker multiplier λo(ω) for
each constraint
∑1
t=0 e¯j(t,ω) ≤ E¯(ω) and form the Lagrangian
L = θ(e¯∗, e¯; r) +
∑
ω∈
λo(ω)(E¯(ω) −
∑
j∈M
1∑
t=0
e¯j(t,ω)). (8)
Therefore, by applying the standard K–T optimality conditions we can see that
the normalized equilibrium is also theNash equilibrium solution for an auxiliary
game with a payoff function defined for each player j by
Jj(e¯) +
∑
ω∈
λj(ω)(E¯(ω) −
∑
j∈M
1∑
t=0
e¯j(t,ω)), (9)
where
λj(ω) = 1
rj
λo(ω), ω ∈ . (10)
This characterization has an interesting interpretation in terms of negotiation
for a climate change policy. A common “tax” λo(ω) is defined and applied to
each player with an intensity 1rj that depends on the weight given to this player
in the global response function.
3 Getting the payoffs via GEMINI-E3
3.1 General overview
The payoffs of the game are computed using GEMINI-E3 which is a
dynamic-recursive CGE describing the world economy in 21 regions with 14
sectors, and which incorporates a highly detailed representation of indirect tax-
ation (Bernard and Vielle 1998). This version of GEMINI-E3 is formulated as
aMixed Complementarity Problem (MCP) using GAMSwith the PATH solver
(Ferris and Munson 2000; Ferris and Pang 1997). GEMINI-E3 is built on a
comprehensive energy-economy data set, the GTAP-5 database (Hertel 1997),
that expresses a consistent representation of energy markets in physical units as
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well as a detailed Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) for a large set of countries
or regions and bilateral trade flows. It is the fourth GEMINI-E3 version that
has been especially designed to calculate the social marginal abatement costs
(MAC), i.e. the welfare loss of a unit increase in pollution abatement (Bernard
and Vielle 2003). The original version of GEMINI-E3 is fully described in
Bernard and Vielle (1998).3 Updated versions of the model have been used to
analyze the implementation of economic instruments for GHG emissions in a
second-best setting (Bernard and Vielle 2000), to assess the strategic allocation
of GHG emission allowances in the EU-wide market (Bernard et al. 2005) and
to analyze the behavior of Russia in the Kyoto Protocol (Bernard et al. 2003,
2005).
For each sector the model computes the demand on the basis of household
consumption, government consumption, exports, investment, and intermediate
uses. Total demand is then divided between domestic production and imports,
using the Armington assumption (Armington 1969). Under this convention
a domestically produced good is treated as a different commodity from an
imported good produced in the same industry. Production technologies are
described using nested CES functions.
3.2 Welfare cost
Household’s behavior consists in three interdependent decisions: (1) labor sup-
ply; (2) savings; and (3) consumption of the different goods and services. In
GEMINI-E3, we suppose that labor supply and the rate of saving are exoge-
nously fixed. The utility function corresponds to a Stone–Geary utility function
(Stone 1983) which is written as
ur =
∑
i
βir · ln(HCir − φir) (11)
where HCir is the household consumption of product i in region r, φir repre-
sents the minimum necessary purchases of good i, and βir corresponds to the
marginal budget share of good i. Maximization under budgetary constraint
HCTr =
∑
i
PCir · HCir (12)
yields
HCir = φir + βirPCir ·
[
HCTr −
∑
k
(PCkr · φkr)
]
, (13)
where PCir is the price of household consumption for product i in region r.
3 For a complete description of the model see our web site and the technical document download-
able at: http://gemini-e3.epfl.ch/.
An oracle based method to compute a coupled equilibrium 127
The welfare cost of climate policies is measured comprehensively by changes
in households’ welfare since final demand of other institutional sectors is sup-
posed unchanged in scenarios. Measurement of this welfare change is repre-
sented by the sum of the change in income and the “Compensative Variation
of Income” (CVI) of the change in prices, according to the classical formula. In
the case of a Stone–Geary utility function, the CVI for a change from an initial
situation defined by the price system (PCir) to a final situation (PCir) is such as
HCTr − ∑i PCir · φir
i(PCir)βir
= HCTr + CVIr −
∑
i PCir · φir
i (PCir)βir
. (14)
The households’ surplus is then given by
Sr =
(
HCTr −
∑
i
PCir · φir
)
− i
(
PCir
PCir
)βir (
HCTr −
∑
i
PCir · φir
)
. (15)
In summary, the CGE model associates a welfare gain (cost) for each country
and each period, with a given emissions program e¯ which defines caps for all
countries at each period. It is important to notice that these welfare gains are
obtained under the assumption that an international emissions trading system
is put in place. It should be noted that we do not take into account the welfare
gain coming from the limitation of the global warming (i.e. the decrease of
damage resulting of the climate change).
4 Oracle-based optimization framework
4.1 Normalized equilibrium and variational inequality
For concave games with differentiable payoff functions Jj(·), e¯∗ is a normalized
equilibrium if and only if it is a solution of the following variational inequality
problem:
〈F(e¯∗), e¯∗ − e¯〉 ≥ 0 ∀e¯ ∈ E , (16)
where 〈·, ·〉 denotes the scalar product and the pseudogradient F(·) is defined
by
F(e¯) =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
r1∇e¯1J1(e¯)
...
rj∇e¯j Jj(e¯)
...
rm∇e¯mJm(e¯)
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
. (17)
It has been proved in Rosen (1965) that a normalized equilibrium exists if the
payoff functions Jj(·) are continuous in e¯ and concave in e¯j and if E is compact.
In the same reference it is proved also that the normalized equilibrium is unique
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if the function −F(·) is strictly monotone, i.e. if the following holds:
〈F(e¯2) − F(e¯1), e¯1 − e¯2〉 > 0 ∀e¯1, e¯2 ∈ E . (18)
Solving (16) is a most challenging problem. When −F is monotone and con-
tinuous or when it is maximal monotone, the strong form of the variational
inequality (16) is known to be equivalent to the so-called weak form (see
Chap. 7 in Nesterov and Nemirovskii 1994)
〈F(e¯), e¯∗ − e¯〉 ≥ 0 ∀e¯ ∈ E . (19)
One can associate to the weak form, the so-called dual-gap function
φ(e¯) = min
e¯′∈E
〈F(e¯′), e¯ − e¯′〉. (20)
This function is concave and non-positive. It achieves a maximum value 0 at
any solution point of (19). Finding a solution to the weak variational inequality
problem thus amounts to maximizing a concave function. Before presenting
a solution method, we point out that we cannot expect from such a method
to find an exact solution. Therefore, we must be satisfied with an approximate
solution. We say that e¯ is an 	-approximate weak solution if
φ(e¯) ≥ −	. (21)
4.2 An oracle method to solve the variational inequality problem
The trouble with the gap function is that it is not computable. Indeed, solving
the minimization problem in (20) is a nonconvex programming problem that is
likely to be as difficult as the original strong variational inequality problem (16).
To circumvent the difficulty, we consider that (21) defines the convex feasibility
problem
Find e¯ ∈ E∗	 = {e¯ ∈ Q | φ(e¯) ≥ −	}. (22)
Since φ is concave, E∗	 is convex. If 	 = 0, the set E∗ = E∗0 is the set of solutions
to the weak variational inequality.
We can associate to E∗ an oracle that provides at any e¯ the separation
hyperplane
〈F(e¯), e¯∗ − e¯〉 ≥ 0 ∀e¯∗ ∈ E∗.
We shall use this property to implement the Analytic Center Cutting Plan
Method (ACCPM) (Goffin et al. 1992) to solve the feasibility problem (22).
This algorithm proceeds as follows. Let {e¯k}k≤K be a series of so-called query
points. We associate to this series the localization set
LK =
{
e¯ ∈ E | 〈F(e¯k), e¯ − e¯k〉 ≥ 0, k = 1, . . . ,K}. (23)
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Note that E∗ ⊂ LK. Recall that in our problem of interest E is a bounded poly-
hedral set. For convenience, we give it the compact form E = {e¯ | Ae¯ ≤ b}.
In ACCPM, the next query point is selected so as to minimize the logarithmic
barrier function
BLK (e¯) = −
∑
j
log(b − Ae¯)j −
∑
k≤K
log(〈F(e¯k), e¯ − e¯k〉). (24)
IfLK has a non-empty interior, the barrier function is well-defined and achieves
its minimum at a unique point, named the analytic center.
Prior to stating the algorithm, we point out two difficulties. The first one is
linked to the nature of the variational inequality problem: we lack a computable
termination criterion because the dual gap function φ(e¯) is not computable. We
propose instead to use the computable condition
〈F(e¯K), e¯ − e¯K〉 ≥ −	 ∀e¯ ∈ E .
Note that this criterion can be checked by solving a simple linear programming
problem. If the criterion is met, it certifies that the point is an approximate
solution to the strong variational inequality. The other difficulty is related to
the computation of F in our game problem of interest. In the game that has
been defined in the previous section, the payoffs are not defined analytically
but are revealed by simulations performed via a CGEmodel. Therefore we had
to implement an oracle-based method where the CGE model, hereafter called
the “oracle”, is queried at each iteration. The oracle returns an information
consisting of (a) the evaluation of the payoff values and, (b) the evaluation of
the pseudogradient at the query point. In the implementation, we evaluate the
pseudogradient at each query point using finite differences.
We can now state the ACCPM algorithm for the game problem
Step 0 (initialization) Set k = 0 and the localization set L0 = E . Choose 	 > 0.
Step 1 (computation of the analytical center)
Compute e¯k = arg mine¯ BLK (e¯) the analytical center of the localization
set Lk.
Step 2 (computation of the pseudogradient)
Compute F(e¯k).
Step 3 (stopping criterion)
Solve the linear programming problem t = min{〈F(e¯k), e¯ − e¯k〉 | e¯ ∈ E}.
IF t ≥ −	 STOP.
Step 4 (generation of a cutting plane)
Update Lk+1 = Lk ∩ {e¯ | 〈F(e¯k), e¯ − e¯k〉 ≥ 0}.
Increment k and GO TO STEP 1.
It has been shown (Luo et al. 1996) that ACCPM solves the convex feasibility
problem in pseudo-polynomial time. Notwithstanding the fact that we can only
approximate F, some basic assumptions of Luo et al. (1996) are not satisfied.
Even if we knew the exact value of F and assumed that F is continuous and
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monotone, our oracle does not separate the solution set φ(e¯) ≥ −	 from the
current query point (we can only separate the point from E∗). However, the
good point is that when our algorithm stops with the test t ≥ −	, we are sure
that the current point is an 	-approximate solution to the strong variational
inequality problem.
We conclude this section by mentioning that there exists a homogeneous
version of ACCPM (Nesterov and Vial 1999) with a polynomial complexity
estimate to compute a weak solution under the assumption that F is monotone.
We have not implemented this version.
5 Numerical results
5.1 Deterministic case
As shown in Fig. 2, global GHG emissions are expected to be close to 15 Giga
tons of Carbon equivalent (GtC-eq) in the business-as-usual scenario.
Our policy scenarios are built on the objective of keeping globalmean surface
warming relative to preindustrial below 2◦. The two-degree target has recently
been put forward by some nations, scientists and environmental organizations.
For example, the European Union endorsed the objective of limiting mean
global warming to below 2◦C over pre-industrial levels to avoid serious cli-
mate change impacts. This translates into stabilization of carbon concentration
toward 550 ppmv and requires to limit global emissions to about 11 GtC-eq in
2050. It represents a −30% reduction target, and around 480 Gt of GHG emis-
sion quotas to share in thewhole period of time. Figure 2 also presents the global
GHG emission trajectory under the unique coupled equilibrium obtained when
the same weight is put on the three players.
Fig. 2 Baseline and policy-constrained global GHG emissions, 2000–2050 (in GtC-eq)
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Fig. 3 GHG emission quotas at the coupled equilibrium, 2000–2050 (in GtC-eq)
Figure 3 depicts the burden sharing obtained when the same weight is put
on the three players. Considering the global constraint on GHG emissions by
2050, the USA, the other industrialized economies, and the developing world
would be committed to reduce their GHG emissions by −33, −26, and −47%,
respectively. As shown on the graph, the players do not delay abatement at
the equilibrium but decide to progressively reduce their emissions. Given these
unilateral decisions on abatement, the GHG price increase smoothly from 108
$/tC-eq in 2025 to 160 $/tC-eq in 2025.
Figure 4 gives the payoffs of the players at the equilibrium. The payoffs are
the total discounted welfare costs associated with the GHG emission constraint
in each region for the whole period of time. In absolute terms, total costs are
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Fig. 4 Welfare costs by region, 2000–2050 (in EV% change)
132 L. Drouet et al.
almost the same for USA and IND; but the non-cooperative equilibrium is
costly for DCs which support 60% of the global welfare cost. In the year 2050,
the equivalent variation of income (see definition in section 3) due to to the
climate policy is around −0.3, −0.2, and −0.9% for the US, the other OECD
countries and developing countries, respectively.
5.2 Sensitivity analysis
As explained in Rosen (1965), the possibly unique normalized equilibrium
should change with the weighting r of the different players. In the previous sec-
tion the same weight was put on the three players of the game. It is completely
arbitrary, andprobably a too strongassumption.To reflect thenegotiatingpower
of the players, the weighting of the players might be defined in consistency with
distributive justice precludes or simply to reflect the negotiating power of the
players. It could be based on population, macro-economic indicators (i.e. GDP,
consumption) and/or environmental indicators (i.e. GHG emissions). It is not
in the aim of this section to try to define the “right” weighting but to explore
how equilibria might change with different weightings.
One simple test is to increase the weight of developing countries compared
to the “balanced” policy case assessed in the previous section. As expected,
this has the effect of reducing the cost of the climate policy for DCs (Fig. 5).
One can define a weighting that would lead to an equilibrium where DCs
do not support any welfare cost. This equilibrium does not correspond to the
burden sharing option, advocated by IEA (2002), Philibert (2000), Philibert
and Pershing (2001), where the baseline emissions are given to the DCs (also
called the “non-constraining target” option). It is a situation where the costs
Fig. 5 North–south utility frontier based on discounted welfare costs for USA+IND and SUD,
2000–2050 (in billion USD)
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of meeting the domestic reduction targets are balanced by the gains associated
with the selling of emission permits. Based on GEMINI-E3 estimates, we find
that DCs might preserve their welfare growth while accepting a 20% reduction
target (compared to their baseline). As shown in Fig. 5, DCs are better off when
their weight increases above 53%. Theymight voluntarily accept to reduce their
GHG emissions in order to participate in international emission trading.
In Fig. 6 we explore the set of coupled equilibria that can be obtained from
changing the weights of the different players. The x-axis represents the weight
of theUSAwhereas the y-axis is for the weight of the other industrialized coun-
tries. The weight of DCs does not appear in this graph but the weights of the
three players always sum to one. We assume that the players are not allowed to
gain from the fight against global climate change. Theweights can be changed to
create incentive for participation and to define an acceptable allocation of the
climate burden but the players are not supposed to be better off with the GHG
emissions constraint than without. As depicted in Fig 5, the weights might range
from 16 to 38%and 18 to 37% for theUnited States and the other industrialized
countries, respectively. The weight of developing countries might go from 24 to
53%.
The resulting manifold of South (SUD) equilibrium outcomes is shown in
Fig. 7.
5.3 Policy scenarios
Weuse the smooth stabilization profiles (SP) constructed byKnutti et al. (2006).
As shown in Fig. 8, the set of scenarios includes direct stabilization at levels of
450, 550, and 650 ppm atmospheric CO2 equivalent (SP450, SP550 and SP650).
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Fig. 8 Smooth stabilization profiles
The emission commitment scenarios depicted in Fig. 9 are calculated based on
SP scenarios and the Bern carbon cycle model.4
In Knutti et al. (2006) an ensemble of probabilistic projections of future
climate change have been performed for a range of CO2 stabilization profiles
intended for the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change are presented. A very large ensemble of simulations with the
reduced complexity, Bern 2.5D climate model was used to explore the uncer-
tainties in projected long term changes in surface temperature and sea level due
4 For more information and the database, see http://www.climate.unibe.ch/emicAR4/.
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Fig. 9 Global emission profiles (in GtC)
Table 1 Probabilities of staying below 2◦C and global emission quotas with SP450, SP550, and
SP650
450 ppmv 550 ppmv 650 ppmv
Quotas (GtC) 426 542 564
Probability of staying below 2◦C 50% 20% 5%
Notes: Own estimates based on:
a Simon Mueller, Climate and Environmental Physics, Physics Institute, University of Bern, see
http://www.climate.unibe.ch/emicAR4/
b R. Knutti, F. Joos, A.S. Mueller, G.-K. Plattner, T.F. Stocker, Probabilistic climate change projec-
tions for stabilization profiles, Geophysical Research Letters, 32, 20, 21 October 2005
c M. Meinshausen, On the risk of overshooting 2◦C, 2632nd Council meeting, Environment, Lux-
embourg, see http://www.stabilisation2005.com/
to uncertainties in climate sensitivity and ocean heat uptake. Previously pub-
lished probability density functions of climate sensitivity are used to calculate
probabilistic projections for different CO2 stabilization levels and to calculate
the probability of not exceeding a certain global mean surface temperature for
a given stabilization level. The resulting probabilities of staying below a cer-
tain equilibrium global mean surface warming for a given stabilization value of
atmospheric CO2 equivalent radiative forcing are reproduced in Fig. 10.5
The scenarios assumptions are summarized in Table 1.
5 All published climate sensitivity PDFs are explored for this graph. The authors propose another
graph based on the more optimistic case where the 1.5 to 4.5 K sensitivity range is assumed to be
the 90% confidence range of a log-normal distribution.
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Fig. 10 Probability of staying below a certain equilibrium global mean surface warming for a
given stabilization value of atmospheric CO2 equivalent radiative forcing for all published climate
sensitivity PDFs
5.4 Simulation results
In Fig. 11, we present the worldwide GHG emissions pathways that correspond
to non-cooperative equilibrium solutions under a global cumulative emissions
constraint by 2050. We compare the coupled equilibrium in the deterministic
and stochastic game framework. When one has to reach a 550 or 650 ppmv
concentration target by 2100 with certainty, GHG emissions increase linearly
from 9 GtC in 2000 to 12.2 and 12.9 GtC in 2050, respectively. In contrast, early
action is required when the players are committed to stabilize at 450 ppmv. In
that case, global GHG emissions are reduced at 7.8 GtC in 2025, and 8.8 GtC
in 2050.
Fig. 11 Global emission path under uncertainty
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Fig. 12 Reduction efforts under uncertainty
Table 2 Equilibrium GHG emissions abatement by regions in 2025 (% change from the BaU)
All GHGs CO2 CH4 N2O F-gases
USA −38% −37% −55% −18% −61%
IND −28% −26% −44% −17% −55%
SUD −44% −50% −34% −13% −64%
WORLD −39% −41% −38% −15% −61%
Table 3 Welfare change at the equilibrium by regions in 2025 (% change from the BaU)
Surplus Terms of trade Permits transfers Deadweight loss
USA −0.36% 0.26% 0.01% −0.63%
IND −0.56% 0.13% −0.22% −0.48%
SUD −2.35% −0.84% 0.43% −1.94%
In the stochastic game, as shown in Fig. 11, early abatement is needed in the
first period of commitment with respect to the deterministic scenarios 550 and
650. In contrary when the real severity of climate change is known emission
path can overtake those of the two deterministic scenarios in the second period
of the simulation.
Figure 12 plots GHG emissions pathways by regions. As shown in the graph,
GHG emissions are reduced by around 18% in USA and in other OECD coun-
tries at the equilibrium in the 2000–2025 period. Under the uncertainty about
the stabilization target, developing countrie’s GHG emissions would go from
4.38 GtC in 2000 to 4.24 GtC in 2025 representing a 3% reduction rate in the
whole period of time.
In Table 2 we present GHG emissions abatement in the stochastic scenario
for the different greenhouse gases described by the GEMINI-E3 model, CO2,
methane and fluorinated gases would have significant reduction. Table 3 shows
the welfare change and the components of this cost under the stochastic frame-
work in 2025 for the three players.
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6 Conclusion
In this paper we have shown how to formulate and solve numerically a non-
cooperative game for the description of climate negotiations under a coupled
constraint on long term carbon concentrations. We have also illustrated the use
of an oracle based method to solve a variational inequality problem where the
gradient operator is revealed by simulations performed with detailed economic
models. The model can take into consideration the main sources of uncertainty
concerning the climate sensitivity. The use of an equilibrium solution instead of
a social optimum leads to solution which are self-enforcing in the sense that a
group of country which agree on the necessity to limit the temperature change
and which accepts the weighting of actors describing the distribution of burden
will have no reason to deviate from the negotiated equilibrium solution.
Our policy scenarios are built on the objective of keeping global mean sur-
face temperature relative to preindustrial levels below 2◦. This target is in
line with the European proposal. Our first simulations take into account three
regions (USA, other OECD countries and developing countries) and two peri-
ods of commitment (2000–2025, 2025–2050). We show that with this concept
of normalized equilibrium we could find solution where the welfare gain for
developing countries is positive and so could motivate the participation of such
group of countries to the second round of negotiation of the Kyoto protocol.
One extension of the model would be to consider several groups of developing
countries (China, India, Brazil, other DCs) and more periods in order to design
more concrete schemes of climate change agreement.
In this first implementation we have restricted the model to a set of two
periods and we have used a a relatively simple description of the technological
choices offered to developed and developing countries. In the forthcoming use
of the method we plan to use technology-rich models like MARKAL-World.6
or TIMES,7 in conjunction with GEMINI-E3 to provide the evaluation of the
players’ payoffs in the oracle-based method.
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